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I. INTRODUCTION
Neutralism holds that government should not base its laws or policies on any particu-
lar view about how people should live; it should provide a neutral framework of rules 
within which people may pursue whatever views of the good life they wish, regardless 
of the plausibility or soundness of those views. Perfectionism rejects this, holding that 
it is permissible for government to act on the basis of conceptions of the good; govern-
ment action should be guided by worthwhile conceptions of the good life. The debate 
between these two views has practical implications. Some criminal prohibitions such as 
laws against drugs, gambling, prostitution, pornography, and homosexuality are called 
into question. While it may be possible to give these laws some neutral justification, at 
least part of their rationale seems to be that the activities themselves are intrinsically 
worthless or of little value. If so, then neutralism would hold that those laws are illegiti-
mate. State-funding decisions would also be affected. For example, neutralism may rule 
out state funding of the arts and rule out favouring classics of literature in public libraries, 
unless some neutral justification can be given for such actions.
Beyond Neutrality by George Sher considers and rejects a number of justifications for 
neutralism and sets out a perfectionist theory. Of the justifications for neutrality that Sher 
criticises, one deserves further scrutiny. The fifth chapter of Beyond Neutrality examines 
the idea that neutrality is a protective device against government oppression. Modern 
states have vast amounts of power, Sher writes: “To keep order, to protect citizens from 
external threats and from each other, and to provide essential services and public goods, 
a government must have both a (near-)monopoly on force and access to great wealth” 
(1997, 106). The fear that states may use this power to oppress people is one that is or 
has been borne out in many countries. Might perfectionism sanction oppression? One 
of the most prominent defenders of neutralism, John Rawls, suggested that the shared 
beliefs required by a perfectionist state “can be maintained only by the oppressive use of 
state power” (1993, 37). Other writers have raised this possibility (e.g. Quong 2011, 35), 
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but it is not usually thought a significant justification for neutrality, so Sher’s discussion 
is pioneering in that respect. Because it limits the reasons for which government may act, 
neutralism may be a way of containing the state’s power and thereby making oppression 
less likely. It would not guarantee the absence of oppression, for as Sher notes it is still 
possible that in a neutral state, “a government that does not oppress in the name of virtue 
or true religion may still do so in the name of prosperity or state security (or, for that mat-
ter, under no justificatory cover at all)” (1997, 109). Neutralism would make oppression 
less likely, however, because it removes one source of motivation for oppressive policies. 
It is a restriction on reasons for state action; with fewer reasons to act, there would be 
fewer reasons to act oppressively. The present contribution examines this view, which 
Sher calls ‘prophylactic neutrality’, in more detail. The first section sets out Sher’s criti-
cisms of the view and responds to them. The second section fleshes out in more detail 
the worry that abandoning neutralism could result in oppressive government and makes 
a case for prophylactic neutrality.
II. SHER’S CRITIQUE OF PROPHYLACTIC NEUTRALITY
Sher’s main criticism of prophylactic neutrality is that it is not the only way of reduc-
ing the likelihood of oppression. Alternatively,, a society could give citizens legal rights 
against their government, dispersing power, but without being neutralist. If so then 
“given a suitably potent array of legal rights, citizens have no need for any further 
protection. Because their rights already block the most dangerous abuses of power, 
they stand to gain little from the additional security of a neutral state. Thus, as long as 
governments recognize and enforce a suitable complement of rights, they can try to 
promote the good without raising the specter of oppression” (Sher 1997, 110). Sher 
concedes, however, that this criticism is open to the rejoinder that legal rights, rather 
than being an alternative to neutralism, themselves embody a way of implementing the 
neutrality constraint. If so, “when rights protect citizens from oppression, they do so 
precisely by making the state neutral” (1997, 110; italics original). Rights exist, so the 
rejoinder suggests, to prevent government from acting on ideals of the good life. Rights 
to freedom of thought and expression, for example, prevent the state from censoring 
material that expresses ideals of the good, ways of life, or religious doctrines that it does 
not like.
In response to this, Sher tries to show that liberal rights do not bring about neutral-
ity because it is quite possible for a society to be perfectionist even though citizens have 
legal rights. He points to current arrangements in the US where there is state-funding 
of the arts, environmental protection laws, and regulation of public obscenity, all in the 
name of promoting ideals of the good; while at the same time, the US is a society where 
citizens have legal rights against government. This, says Sher, shows that having legal 
rights does not implement neutrality; since “nonneutral laws and policies do coexist with 
our current rights, then we obviously can have adequate protection without having a 
neutral state” (1997, 112; italics original).
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But this is a mistaken conclusion. It is true that in the US individuals have legal 
rights against government while at the same time also having some perfectionist policies 
(and the same could be said about other countries in Europe and in Canada, Australia, 
and New Zealand), but this does not prove the point. For it could be the case that these 
legal rights embody a sphere of neutrality while leaving room for perfectionist policies 
outside that sphere. The view I have in mind here is the kind defended by John Rawls and 
Brian Barry, where neutrality is a requirement for some central core of government deci-
sions, but government may permissibly act on perfectionist reasons for decisions outside 
this core. Rawls’ view is that neutrality is required with respect to “constitutional essen-
tials and matters of basic justice” but does not apply to “many economic and social issues 
that legislative bodies must regularly consider” (1994, 230; see also 214-215). Similarly, 
Barry’s view is that neutrality applies only to some but not all political decisions (although 
he thinks a different type of neutrality applies to the others), advocating constitutional 
as opposed to legislative neutrality (1995, 161). According to this view, for example, 
government must not favour one religion over others, say by making it the state religion 
that all government ministers must adhere to and that is taught in public schools; but it 
would be permissible, however, for government to permit nativity scenes to be displayed 
in town squares (provided such decisions are arrived at by democratic decision-making). 
What precisely is meant by “constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice” is not 
clear. One way of making the distinction (though it is not Rawls’ or Barry’s) is in terms of 
coercive versus non-coercive government actions. The insistence could be on the state 
being neutral in its coercive measures but not in its non-coercive policies; it could have 
state-funding of the arts but not be permitted to force anyone into art-appreciation.1
Let us assume that there is some way of making the distinction and use the expres-
sion ‘core neutrality’ to refer to the idea that the state must be neutral with regard to 
some core of its arrangements (such as its constitutional essentials or its coercive meas-
ures), but that permits perfectionism in periphery decisions. Contrary to Sher’s argument, 
countries whose governments have perfectionist policies but also protect legal rights do 
not defeat prophylactic neutrality because those countries may be perfectionist but only 
at the periphery, while being neutral at their core. Sher’s idea is that societies that are 
perfectionist, but also have legal rights, demonastrate that it is possible to do without 
neutrality and still avoid oppression. Nevertheless, it might be the case that the neutrality 
constraint is working in the background as the rationale for legal rights while govern-
ment acts on perfectionist considerations in ways that do not violate legal rights. Perhaps 
neutralism is providing the framework of rights that protect people from oppression and 
that within this framework there is room for perfectionist policies.
A similar point applies to another argument that Sher makes. He considers 
neutralism as a modus vivendi among people with competing conceptions of the good; 
without it, so this justification for neutralism goes, there would be conflict, animosity, 
and bitterness. Against this, Sher argues that the effects of perfectionism are not that 
severe because there are stabilizing forces such as the liberalism of a tolerant mind-set. 
But then Sher considers the response: might this mind-set itself be rooted in neutrality? 
Sher argues that those attitudes have flourished in non-neutral societies (1997, 119-20). 
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Nonetheless, our response should be as before; the fact that liberal toleration occurs in 
non-neutral societies does not mean that it is not itself derived from a belief in neutrality, 
since societies are a mixture of neutrality and nonneutrality.
Is this reply a problem for perfectionists like Sher? Perhaps not, if all they want 
from a perfectionist theory is perfectionist policies outside the core. But they would have 
failed to refute prophylactic neutrality. The core of government in this view is neutral and 
neutrality is what provides protection against oppression. The worry remains that a more 
thorough-going perfectionism may be oppressive; if perfectionist reasons were permitted 
to guide core decisions the result could be oppression.
III. PERFECTIONISM AND OPPRESSION
To fully decide the matter we need to look at whether a perfectionist state can avoid 
oppression or will instead sanction it. Why is it thought that the result of state action 
guided by perfectionist reasons could be oppression? First let me start with a seemingly 
innocuous point: leading a life that is good is important. We want our lives to be good; 
it would be a bad thing if we were living our lives spent in trivial, pointless, worthless 
activities. This, however, has significant consequences because it is possible that leading 
a life that is good might be so important that it outweighs other considerations, such as 
letting people choose for themselves. Some examples will illustrate this general point. 
Imagine that it turns out to be true that God exists and that God requires a certain type of 
worship. From a perfectionist point of view it would seem fairly important that 
people lead their lives according to this fact; that any life that does not comply with it 
is an impaired one, bad for the person who lives it. If people are not attending religious 
services as they ought, then a perfectionist government should force them. Consider 
next ideals of sexuality. In some views, the most worthwhile form of sex, the one that is 
most intrinsically valuable, is that which is aimed at reproduction. Perhaps this should be 
accompanied by loving respect for one’s sexual partner and a commitment to that person 
(and to raise any offspring that may result), but loving respect and commitment in sexual 
activity alone are not worthwhile; they are valuable, according to the view being consid-
ered, only when they accompany reproductive sexual activity. This would mean that non-
reproductive sex is of lesser value, and is perhaps of very little or even of no value. People 
who enjoy engaging in non-reproductive sex would be making a mistake about the nature 
of the good life. Moreover, it may well be a fairly significant mistake if valuable sexual 
activity is a weighty component of a good life. It may be so significant that a perfectionist 
state could be justified in interfering in the lives of those who are making the mistake.
These examples illustrate how it is possible that a perfectionist state could sanction 
oppression. Perfectionists may respond that these are crude characterisations of what 
a perfectionist state would be like. There are many other considerations to take into 
account, they would argue, which result in it being less likely that a perfectionist state 
would be oppressive. Here, for example, is what Sher says about the worry of religious 
oppression: 
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If someone believes the price of wickedness is an eternity in hell, he will quite properly 
take worldly harmony to be of little moment. By his lights, saving souls – his own and 
those of others – will indeed be the only thing worth doing. But not all religious doc-
trines do have such extreme implications, and many conceptions of the good are not 
religious at all. Thus, very few in our (or any other Western) society have this sort of 
reason to pull out all the stops […] [Usually] even the most passionate adherent of a 
particular conception of the good is well able to moderate his demands (1997, 121-122). 
Elsewhere in Beyond Neutrality, Sher also sets forth what a perfectionist theory on his 
view should say about sexuality. In his view, sexual activity should be private because it 
involves the ability to bestow personal information selectively. This would count against 
promiscuous impersonal sex, but not against non-reproductive sex. Moreover, non- 
reproductive sex would not be condemned based on his view that only near-unavoidable 
goals are valuable. Many people, Sher notes, have “no interest in reproducing at all. When 
someone lacks such interest, it is hard to see how his using his sexual organs to reproduce 
would make the world a better place or him better off” (1997, 218). 
Reasoning of this type may demonstrate that perfectionism need not be oppressive 
(although Sher’s view would seem to sanction intervention against sexual promiscuity). 
There are other considerations that perfectionists would claim have to be taken into account:
i.   With regard to religion there is the Lockean argument that religious devotion 
requires inner persuasion of the mind, and since external compulsion cannot bring 
about inner states, there is no point in coercing people into religion (Locke 2005).
ii.   Perhaps the good is pluralistic; perhaps, that is, there are many forms of the good 
and they are equally valuable or incommensurable in the sense that they are not 
worth more or less than each other, but nor are they equally valuable; they are 
simply valuable in their own way (Raz 1986). If so there would be no reason for 
intervention guiding people away from lifestyles.
iii.  Perhaps the good life must be an autonomous one or one that expresses indi-
viduality or that in some other way depends on personal choice. 
Sher holds that the good is fragmented and plural and that autonomy, desire-satisfaction, 
and happiness are important goods (1997, 120). If so, and if the reasons for personal choice 
are important enough to outweigh whatever value there may be in forcing people into 
valuable activities, then the nature of the good will be less in favour of oppressive govern-
ment intervention of the kind that I have suggested. These claims about the good will 
not be assessed here (but see Clarke 2006). They may turn out to be true and weighty. 
If so, then perfectionism would not lead to oppression. For ease of reference, I will 
refer henceforth to the possibility of the good turning out to be such that it motivates 
oppression as ‘the good is oppressive’ while that it does not as ‘the good is non-oppressive’.
We can now see the reasoning behind prophylactic neutrality. Perfectionist con-
siderations may be incompatible with individual rights due to the nature of the good. 
Depending on how the nature of the good turns out – whether the good is oppressive or 
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not – then perfectionism may or may not be oppressive. If the nature of the good is non-
oppressive, then Sher is right to hold that neutrality is not necessary in order to avoid 
oppression. But if instead the good is oppressive then perfectionism would be oppressive 
and – insofar as oppression is something we want to avoid – the prophylactic case for 
neutralism would stand.
Is the nature of the good oppressive or not? Much work still remains to be done to 
answer this question. Before we can respond we need to know, among other things, the 
truth about religion, about sexuality, about value pluralism, and about the importance 
of autonomy and individuality in the good life. In our present state of uncertainty about 
these questions, there is a case for neutralism. Either government could be perfectionist 
– which may or may not result in oppression depending on the nature of the good – or 
it could be neutral, in which case it has less reason to be oppressive. Given the dangers 
of oppression we should err on the side of caution and embrace neutralism because oth-
erwise, if government is perfectionist, the nature of the good may turn out to be oppres-
sive. True, the good may turn out not to be oppressive, but we should not take the risk.
This precautionary reasoning is similar to Pascal’s wager, according to which the 
consequences of not believing in God if God turns out to exist are much worse than the 
consequences of believing in God. If you choose the former, you will receive eternity in 
hell, but if you opt for the latter you will be granted eternity in heaven (and if it turns out 
that God does not exist then all you have wasted is some time and effort in worshipping). 
You will not lose much if you turn out to be wrong but you will gain a lot if you turn 
out to be correct. As Pascal wrote: “Let us compare the two cases; if you win, you win 
everything; if you lose, you lose nothing. Don’t hesitate then. Take a bet that he exists” 
(Pascal 2009, 536).
The case for prophylactic neutrality applies a similar kind of reasoning to the 
question of whether government should be neutral. The nature of the good could be 
oppressive or it could not be. Either the state could be perfectionist; if the good is 
oppressive then the result could be oppression; if the good is non-oppressive then op-
pression is less likely. Or the state could be neutral; if the good is oppressive then it will 
not matter since the state will not be guided by it and the result is that government is 
less likely to be oppressive; if the good is non-oppressive then the result is still the same. 
The rational wager is towards neutrality. If we accept perfectionism, the result could be 
terrible if the good turned out to be oppressive. But if we accept neutralism and the good 
turns out to be non-oppressive then we have lost something – the gains of perfectionist 
policies – but these surely are a sacrifice worth making in order to avoid the dangers of 
oppression. By accepting neutralism we gain the huge advantage of avoiding oppression. 
The alternative would not gain us much.
This is in a sense a reversal of Pascal’s wager, because the latter was for religion while 
the reverse is against the use of religion in politics (or conceptions of the good life gener-
ally). It is not actually a wager against being religious – that might still be a good bet on a 
personal level – but it is a wager against permitting religion (and conceptions of the good) 
to have influence in politics.
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Even though it has the same structure as Pascal’s wager, the reverse wager avoids 
the main difficulty usually thought to apply to Pascal’s. Pascal’s wager assumes that belief 
is a matter of choice; that you can just decide to believe in God or not. But this is prob-
ably false; belief is determined by how the evidence and arguments appear to you and is 
not subject to direct control (Taliaferro 1998, 381; Zagzebski 2007, 64). While this is a 
problem for Pascal’s wager, it does not apply here, for accepting neutralism is a matter of 
choice unlike a belief in God. Society can just decide that government should be neutral 
rather than perfectionist and implement that decision by adopting political arrangements 
that rule out perfectionist policies. The neutralism-perfectionism issue is a matter of 
choice to decide upon, unlike a personal belief in God.
It is important to be clear about what kind of argument is being made here. Some-
times perfectionism is objected to on pragmatic grounds; the worry is that the state could 
implement misguided or false conceptions of the good. Religious fanatics, for example, 
could implement their false views through the state. (Raz 1986, 428-429; Quong 2011, 
35). That is not the argument being made here. The argument here is that even if the 
ideals of the good are truly ideals, even if they are worthwhile conceptions of the good, 
perfectionism could sanction their imposition, oppressively if necessary.
One possible objection to this case for prophylactic neutrality is that it rests on 
a claim about uncertainty about the good: that we are uncertain whether the good is 
oppressive or not. Many defenders of neutralism have appealed to uncertainty or scepti-
cism about the good as a way of ruling out state action based on conceptions of the good, 
but this strategy faces the criticism that other political claims – for example about justice 
and rights – are no more certain as claims about ideals of life (Clarke 1999; Quong 2011). 
As Sher puts it, there is no more reason to be sceptical about the good than there is to be 
sceptical about matters that neutralism holds that it is legitimate for government to act 
on the basis of (1997, 142). Since the reverse Pascal’s wager appeals to uncertainty about 
whether the good is oppressive or not, it seems open to this criticism of using scepticism 
about the good as a justification for neutralism.
The reverse wager for neutralism does indeed make a claim about uncertainty of 
the good: that we are uncertain whether the good is oppressive or not. But that is not 
the same as a claim of uncertainty about the good in general: that we do not hold any 
beliefs about the good with certainty. The latter does invite the response that our be-
liefs about justice and rights may similarly lack certainty. But although the more limited 
claim of uncertainty about whether the good is oppressive may similarly invite a response 
that we are uncertain whether a neutral state would be oppressive, that response is less 
convincing. For the reverse wager argument goes through provided it is more likely that 
perfectionism would be oppressive than it is that a neutral state would be oppressive. And that claim, 
as far as I can see, cannot help but be true. As has already been noted, a neutral state 
may well be oppressive, but a perfectionist state is more likely to be for the simple reason 
that the latter makes more reasons available for government to act on. The difference 
between neutralism and perfectionism is just that under the latter there are more reasons 
for state action than under the former. Hence, whatever sources of oppression there are 
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under neutralism are also present under perfectionism, and the latter has further sources, 
namely the motivation to promote conceptions of the good. So, we may be uncertain 
whether neutral reasons for state action would result in oppression, but a perfectionist 
state adds further reasons to these: nonneutral reasons for state action, and so we must 
be even more uncertain whether a perfectionist state would be oppressive.
The only way around this that I can see would be for perfectionists to show that the 
nature of the good is not only non-oppressive, but is even more oppression-minimising 
than a neutral state would be. For instance, they could argue that autonomy is so impor-
tant as an element of the good life that its relevance in a perfectionist state would coun-
teract any tendency towards oppression that would be present in a neutral state, as well as 
counteracting any tendency towards oppression in the nature of the good. Perhaps (so the 
argument would go) a neutral state would be oppressive, and perfectionism avoids this by 
emphasising the liberty-supporting elements of the good life. However we have already 
seen two reasons that when combined should make us doubt this strategy: (i) there are 
elements of the good that tend towards oppression, and (ii) we are uncertain whether the 
good will turn out to be oppressive or non-oppressive overall. Even taking into account 
the possibility that the nature of the good may push society away from oppression, the 
possibility of the opposite tendency should make us accept neutrality as the best bet.
IV. CONCLUSION
Perfectionism may lead to oppression or it may not, depending on the nature of the 
good. The alternative, neutralism, may also result in oppression, but is less likely to since 
one set of motivations for oppression would be removed. To reduce the possibility of 
oppression, we should have a neutral state.
More work has to be done on comparing neutralism and perfectionism in terms 
of their likelihood of leading to oppression, but I hope to have supplied some reason to 
think that neutralism has an advantage in this respect. One assumption that has not been 
explored is why oppression is bad; a possible response to the view defended here is that 
even if perfectionism leads to oppression we should just accept it. Perhaps oppression 
in the name of furthering the good is justified. That, however, would be a bold move for 
defenders of perfectionism such as Sher to make.
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NOTES
1. This position would have to reply to the standard objection that in its supposedly non-
coercive realm such as funding decisions, it actually is coercive since the taxes used to raise funds 
are coercively imposed. 
Neutralism, Perfectionism and Respect for Persons
Michael Schefczyk – Leuphana Universität, Lüneburg, Germany
I. INTRODUCTION
Neutralism, which is roughly speaking the doctrine that the state should not implement 
or promote ideals of the good life (Barry 1965/1970, 69ff.; Raz 1986, 110ff.; Sher 1997, 
34), is a broad church. It ranges from a purist commitment to full self-ownership as 
the fundamental moral right, which we find in libertarianism (Nozick 1974/1999; van 
Parijs 1995; for a critical discussion Wall 2009), to more nuanced views prevailing in 
liberal egalitarianism (Rawls 1993; Larmore 1996; Rawls 2001), libertarian paternalism 
(Thaler and Sunstein 2008) or in John Stuart Mill’s version of utilitarian liberalism (Mill 
1863/1969).
In contrast to Sher’s declaration that “neutralism is false” (1997, 3), I shall argue 
that neutral states can do a lot in order to promote the good life of the residents. A plau-
sible form of neutralism does not exclude perfectionist reasons tout court from political 
